Rivista di estetica, n.s., 37 (1/2008), XLVIII, Gabriella T. Giorno The VIewed VIeweR In GeRhaRd RIchTeR 'S OctOber 18, 1977 as when by night the glass Of Galileo, less assured, observes Imagined lands and regions in the moon John Milton, Paradise Lost
Most artists are alicted with more than common stupidity, and this makes them even more desperate than they need be, and so they make themselves even more stupid than they really are, and so they make themselves artistically impotent -because, by panicking (consciously or unconsciously) at their own nonsense, they lose all self-respect and can produce either nothing whatever or nothing but unspeakable stupidity.
Gerhard Richter art critics have tried to understand Gerhard Richter's meaning for decades. Yet they have run into the possibility that there may be no chance of ever inding any omniscient manifesto for his works. In interviews with Robert Storr, Richter politely bursts into laughter just when Storr thinks that he has identiied the values along what has been called the Richter scale. Richter's intent in creating October 18, 1977 has proved to be especially enigmatic because he at once decides upon a historical and deeply controversial subject while also placing a sense of responsibility for viewing the works upon the viewer. consequently, the «Richter scale» is more aptly termed the Richter problematic. I believe that a phenomenological approach proves to be especially useful in apprehending the challenging conundrum that Richter's artwork poses to viewers. Since phenomenology examines how we perceive rather than what we perceive, this mode of philosophical discourse opens up new spaces for an understanding of Gerhard Richter's work in its inherently experiential quality. hree philosophers in particular have established the underpinnings for any attempt to explore the phenomenology of Richter's art: they include Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de certeau, and edith Stein. while it could be said that Richter is the judge of any interpretation of his art, I hope that this article's refusal to claim an understanding of his work will go down the drain with the excess paint of his brushes.
Pierre Bourdieu poses a question about artistic creation that refracts upon itself in the title of his essay, «But who created the "creators"?» he question encompasses its answer and at last forces him to exclaim: «So we've come full circle. and we are caught inside» 1 . he phases of artistic creation might appear to catch those of us who are interested in art within an endless labyrinth 2 with no escape. however certain we are of this circulatory labyrinth or its supposed ending 3 , there remains the impossibility of ever coming full circle. Perhaps the circle already fails to contain any artistic meaning in the irst place. Gerhard Richter calls into question Bourdieu's own question by his double vision of his art: «I want the picture; the single, self-contained construct -even if in the next breath I cast doubt on its self-containment» 4 . he creates by using his brush to cast doubt upon contained phases of history or aesthetic tastes. In viewing Richter's art, our world as viewers is spatialized according to our interaction with the paintings: this encounter with the «appearance of reality» ills the full circle with rips. as with the pedestrians of new York city described by Michel de certeau, the viewers of Richter's paintings «are not localized; it is rather they that spatialize» 5 . he circle of Richter's art is not local because its location is continually leaving itself in the radical spatialization of what de certeau calls «sieve-order» 6 . his leads to the question: can sieve-order say anything at all? In fact, the sieve, whatever the pattern written there might say, is a text that a Richter painting «write [s] without being able to read it» 7 . while many critics try with great efort to read the text of a Richter painting, Richter himself argues instead for a phenomenology of perception in October 18, 1977 as his art phases in and out of the ellipses in the circle.
By avoiding 8 any attempt to pinpoint or interpret the meaning behind his works, Richter ofers a two-dimensional world in which his paintings view the viewer. Bourdieu's claim that an objectively drawn correspondence can be established «between the producer […] and his audience» 9 leads us to the key importance of empathy as the agent responsible for showing the ability of a Richter painting to phase in and out between two subjects. hence, his paintings enact the «two-sidedness» 10 of the empathetic act as a mode of «perceiving sui generis» 11 . he two-sidedness of empathy makes each of Richter's October paintings «an unendurable picture from every point of view» 12 precisely because we cannot draw any objective, one-to-one meanings out of the paintings. In fact, the painfulness of every point of view results from the view as view. Richter forces us to consider each view thus making the unendurable experience of the other's experiences our own as well:
But when you realize just how much we do refuse our compassion, how calmly we look on while hundreds of thousands starve or are tortured or killed -we never choke on a single forkful. his is more than avoiding compassion in order to survive: it's almost worse than killing. and the killing goes on anyway, day after day. we can always push the responsibility of onto other people -but it's really all of us. no other species does this 13 . at the irst glance of Youth Portrait in the October paintings, Richter challenges his viewer's point of view as such by making our calm absolutely unendurable. Richter demands not a one-to-one view that can match this meaning with that name but rather the two-sidedness of the empathetic act. any perforation in sieve-order must go through one side to another. empathy thus perforates Richter's works. his art expresses ambivalence for two reasons. Firstly, no objective correspondence is possible whether unconsciously or consciously. Furthermore, the ideology of his artwork consists not so much in anti-ideology, as some critics have claimed, but rather in Michel de certeau's deinition of a nowhen. de certeau says that the nowhen, is a «synchronic system» which substitutes «for the indeterminable and stubborn resistances ofered by traditions» 14 . he nowhen characterizes Richter's nearly utopian desire to displace the event of October 18, 1977 by creating October 18, 1977 y concern is never art, but always what art can be used for» 15 . his art is used to present «the act itself of passing by» (certeau 1993: 131) with each viewing as perforation.
produced Pop-derived and politically engaged igure paintings, dispassionate abstractions, sentimental landscapes, romanticized portraits, and more» (wilkin 2002: 34 Gerhard Richter's October 18, 1977 causes an act of perception not simply in a visual sense but also in an empathetic sense. his exhibit enacts a phenomenological reduction impacting not only political views about the Red army Faction but also aesthetic views about art. By reducing the viewer's presuppositions, Richter forces the viewer to concentrate only upon their experience of the phenomenon of perception. consequently, Richter's art acts as a medium permitting us to see intersubjective experience. October 18, 1977 forces the viewer to experience de certeau's sieve-order as the intersection of subjectivities through empathy. empathy is the process whereby we perceive what falls through the sieve. Our habitus 16 is ordered by this sieve-order. Richter's artwork creates a clearing 17 for the possibility of empathy as an «encounter between a socially constituted habitus and a particular position that is already instituted or possible in the division of the labour of cultural production» 18 . he creative impulse of Richter's works channels itself through empathy. as a result of the two-sidedness of the empathetic encounter, the very form of Richter's works demands this clash between the social world and the particular position of the viewer with regard to October 18, 1977. he paintings in Richter's exhibition clearly view the viewer thus bringing to the foreground the question of how perception occurs.
as a sifting process, empathy examines the form of intersubjective experience rather than the mere content of ideologies. For Richter, what passes through the sieve is of no concern because he is interested rather in the phases of the sieve as they are perceived through empathy. he phases inhere how the viewer sees via the empathetic act. however, the punctures in this sieve are themselves unstable because neither the painting's point of view nor that of the viewer can be clearly demarcated. he surface of the encounter between the habitus of the work of art and the viewer's position «is everywhere punched and torn open by ellipses, drifts, and leaks of meaning: it is a sieve-order» 19 . as an enactment that is always in lux, empathy allows for an experience of the empty spaces created by this encounter 20 within the sieve by passing them by. as a result, Richter's art takes up the function of language in its «absolute refusal to make a statement» 21 . 16 Rainer Rochlitz claims that Richter makes a choice to paint images that «are dated, stereotyped, ignorant of the "habitus" which they embody and whose obtuse rigidity are plain for the eye to see thanks to painting» (Rochlitz 2000: 116) . however, Richter does not ignore the habitus of the photographs as Rochlitz would have it. as I will show, he uses their habitus in order to show that the painted image is the medium of his constant perforations. 17 as Martin heidegger says, «[t]he clearing grants irst of all the possibility of the path to presence, and grants the possible presencing of that presence itself» (heidegger 1993: 445) . 18 Bourdieu 2003 18 Bourdieu : 98. 19 certeau 1993 Bourdieu realizes that space is also crucial to analyzing how the producer and his artistic product interact: «hus the proper object of a science of art, literature or philosophy can be nothing other than this structure of two inseparable spaces, the space of the products and the space of the producers (artists or writers, and also critics, publishers, etc.), which are like two translations of the same sentence» (Bourdieu 2003: 101) . 21 Richter 1993: 170. he habitus of language «is empty, but not gone» 22 . he pictures of Richter's October 18, 1977 announce our perception of the work itself because «their presence is the horror and the hard-to-bear refusal to answer, to explain, to give an opinion» 23 .
he Viewer as Viewed 24
For Richter, empathy at irst appears to act as the sieve responsible for iltering through pessimism in order to arrive at hope 25 . In his notes, Richter explains that his art embodies the «pessimistic, nihilistic actions and assertions [that] have the sole aim of creating or discovering hope» 26 . he movement of our perceptions through the sieve-order of his art embodies a modiication of the content of pessimism into the form of hope. his works seem to announce a pessimism that turns into hope «through the very act of painting, which becomes an airmation of self» 27 . with regard to October 18, 1977, Richter says that «I'm not so sure whether the pictures "ask" anything; they provoke contradiction through their hopelessness and desolation, their lack of partisanship» 28 . hence the apparent 22 Stein 2000: 12. 23 Richter 1993: 175. 24 Peter Gidal's notion of the view within the viewing illuminates how we can perceive Richter's works: «You are left with a painting of nothing, without a useful concept of sublimation or metaphor: substitution, one thing for another, an image for a meaning, a meaning for a psychology, a psychoanalytic for an anthropomorphic consciousness, an unconsciousness for an ideology. without that, each moment is literally, materially, for the viewer, in the viewing, gone at its visible inception. Yet that process, whether a remnant or not, is a painting, a present material nonmemory. he necessary elisions to "make" a memory are processed through the viewer into the uselessness of continual use, making endless inalities» (Gidal 1995: 19) . however, what I call the viewer as viewed signiies not only the viewer's perception of the painting but the painting's view of the viewer. his view on the part of the painting is a metaphor that Rochlitz also bypasses too quickly. Rochlitz mistakes this interactive nature of Richter's works for a dialectic that prompts the viewer to gather an excess of information in an attempt to name the genre while trying to classify the paintings' social status: «If in Richter's work there is a dialectic of gazes and an interaction with the receptor, it is by means of this generic treatment: the spectator is asked to see not merely the individual image which he has before him but the genre to which it belongs as well as social character of this mode of representation» (Rochlitz 2000: 113 Richter riddles language with holes in order to allow us to see that the a priori -that is to say, the longing for God -extends beyond the causa sui constraints imposed by the linguistic construction of theories. he perforations of the sieve allow for a luidity of discourse because nothing is seen as the same: this experience «is a "now" in between a "no longer" and a "not yet"» 34 . Richter demands 29 Stein 1989: 19. 30 Michel de certeau writes that «[d]isposed in constellations that hierarchize and semantically order the surface of the city, operating chronological arrangements and historical justiications, their words …. slowly lose, like worn coins, the value engraved on them, but their ability to signify outlives its irst deinition» (certeau 1993: 132) . 31 In On the Problem of empathy, Stein explains: «the experience of foreign consciousness can only be the non-primordial experience which announces a primordial one» (Stein 1989: 15) . 32 Richter 1993: 170. 33 Ivi: 182. 34 Stein 2002: 37. that our perception of his exhibit occur in the here and now 35 since, as a painter of pictures «that weren't paintable» 36 , he ascribes a linguistic irreducibility to his works 37 , Pierre Bourdieu realizes this as well with regard to the artist who puts his priceless work on the market with a price tag: the artist in question must then deal with the emptiness of meaning imposed by this false value 38 . however, Richter takes his paintings a step further. he not only encounters this imposition of value as a constraint but he punctures them through his art most especially in October 18, 1977 . By taking the photographs of the Baader-Meinhof group and painting only the ones that weren't paintable, Richter makes the punctures, the voids of meaning imposed by interpretation, into the form itself of his artwork.
In an unpaintable 39 manner, Richter's work may be understood as a current 40 in the sense that this perforating process 41 occurs ad ininitum 42 as the paintings take the value conceptions of the viewers through sieve-order. If each picture is a phase of sieve-order in October 18, 1977, then each one reverts back to a «single generative impulse which nourishes everything that transpires in the live becoming of that phase» 43 . Richter's exhibit inheres its own phases within a single current because the generative impulse of the perforation always results from the 35 empathy accounts for the way in which we perceive time because it is responsible for the «here and now» of intersubjective experience (Stein 1989: 7) . 36 Richter 1993: 186. 37 Storr remarks that Michael Brenson, in an article for the New York times, «seized upon Richter's desire "to paint the unpaintable"» (Storr 2000: 35) . 38 Bourdieu 1998: 12-33. 39 Storr discusses Richter's unpaintable way of painting in both Gerhard richter October 18, 1977 and Gerhard richter: Doubt and belief in Painting. 40 In the Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, Stein develops her notion of «lifepower» by comparing it to an electrical current. She believes that lifepower emanates from the community (Stein 2000: 203) . 41 Richter refers to his art as the process of a how including everything and nothing at the same time: «To start of with the "how" is frivolous, but legitimate. apply the "how", and thus use the requirements of technique, the material and physical possibilities, in order to realize the intention. he intention: to invent nothing -no idea, no composition, no object, no form -and to receive everything: composition, object, form, idea, picture. even in my youth, when I somewhat naively had "themes" (landscapes, self-portraits), I very soon became aware of this problem of having no subject. Of course, I took motifs and represented them, but this was mostly with the feeling that these were not the real ones, but imposed, dog-eared, artiicial ones. he question "what shall I paint?" showed me my own helplessness, and I often envied (still do envy) the most mediocre painters those "concerns" of theirs, which they so tenaciously and mediocrely depict (I fundamentally despise them for it» (Richter 1993: 129-30 ). Richter's inability to have a theme encapsulates the meaning of his work as an expressive process. hough he does not use the medium of language but rather that of art, Richter's comment can be clariied by Stein's notion that «verbal expressions are not themes themselves, but only the intermediate points to the theme, namely, to that which they designate» (Stein 1989: 79 ). Richter's paintings indeed point to an a priori theme.
42 as Richter himself argues, his paintings are never inished: «I don't believe in the absolute picture. here can only be approximations, experiments, and beginnings, over and over again» (Richter 1993: 199) . 43 Stein 2000:13. according to Stein, this current turns out to be the I: «You can also say the current is one because it streams forth for one I. Because what lives into the future out of the past, what feels new life bursting out of itself every moment, what carries the whole trail of bygones with itself -that's the I» (Stein 2000: 13) . empathetic encounter. Richter's use of grey shades emphasizes the vacuous space created from this encounter. however, it is crucial to realize that this a priori vacuity is not void but only empty. he grey 44 tones of his exhibition manifest this emptiness of colour 45 . Richter explains:
I did have a special relationship with grey. Grey to me, was the absence of opinion, nothing, neither/nor. It was also a means of manifesting my own relationship with apparent reality. I didn't want to say: "It is thus and not otherwise." and then perhaps I didn't want anyone to confuse the pictures with reality 46 .
Richter thus counts upon using the absences inherent in sieve-order as the means to express -not what he means -but rather what he didn't want to say. By deining his art in terms of nothing, Richter in turn reveals that reality in his artwork constitutes a sieve-order.
October 18, 1977 cannot be referred to as the reality 47 of what happened on October 18, 1977, because the exhibit does not allow for any circumscribed deinition of a historical set of events. art perforates history through the present moment. edith Stein's explanation supports our claim:
although the present moment could not be without past and future, these latter two dimensions of time are not static: they are not containers in which something could be preserved or from which something could emerge; no enduring being can be concealed in them 48 .
44 Storr tries to conine Richter's use of grey to the past: «Grey was also a way of showing that he was painting the past, and a signal that he had opted for a style belonging to his past» (Storr 2000: 112). Richter does not allow for the past to be quite so neatly partitioned because, as Stein shows, neither the past nor the future can be contained. In fact, Richter tries to move away from the presupposition that October 18, 1977 deals with the past. 45 For Richter, grey is not a non-colour: «Grey is a colour -and sometimes, to me, the most important of all» (Richter 1993: 75) . his view coincides with Stein's phenomenological interpretation of the way that we ill the ields of our senses: «But even silence is an occupation of the auditory ield; it is now empty but precisely empty of tones and not somehow of colors or something else. It is empty, but not gone» (Stein 2000: 12) . as an empty colour, grey is the only colour capable of making «"nothing" visible [as] the only possible equivalent for indiference, noncommitment, absence of opinion, absence of shape» (Richter 1993: 83) . 46 Richter 1993: 70. 47 Many critics attempt to ind a longing for the past in Richter's works. For example, Michael I. danof claims: «For Richter it is acceptable that reality remains incomprehensible» (danof 1988: 13) . however, Richter does not even go so far as to suggest that he doesn't understand reality. Rather he makes no attempt to understand reality at all! he says «You realize that you can't represent reality at all -that what you make represents nothing but itself, and therefore is itself reality» (Richter 1993: 72) . dietmar elger ofers a more useful view of Richter's historical implications: «he […] touched on the contradiction inherent in his use of the term "nostalgic" to describe his paintings: "I had nothing against describing my perception of landscape as nostalgia. Yet that is an imprecise term; it means a yearning reaching into the past for what has been lost, and that makes no sense. why should I reach backwards if something is present in the here and now."» (elger 1998: 21) . 48 Stein 2002: 39-40. Richter thus seeks neither to preserve the past nor to create a future from it 49 . On the contrary, his work represents the instability of containing past, present, and future. By manifesting his own changing relationship with reality, Richter argues that the reality of the present moment leads to his depiction of grey which names the absence of opinion, nothing, neither/nor. his work compels questions that perforate through reality into hole punches rather than answers that would attempt to contain it at all times. Richter explains why he «paint[s] these pictures» in a few phrases: «deadly reality, inhuman reality. Our rebellion. Impotence. Failure. death» 50 . he emptiness indicated by these phrases points to the sieve-order in Richter's October 18, 1977 . he says «my motivation counts for nothing, as far as the pictures are concerned: they are independent of it, because they are themselves a piece of reality» 51 . If Richter's use of grey is meant to prevent us from confusing the pictures with reality, then his statement that the October paintings are a piece of reality at irst poses a conundrum to viewers. he deadly reality in the paintings is responsible for creating a sieve-order because of the «leaks of meaning» 52 inherent in rebellion, impotence, failure and death. Richter presents the catalyst for this process when he names 53 nothing as the equivalent of grey: such a naming irrevocably mars our conidence in the certitude of our ideas which are perhaps nothing at all and thus not to be confused with reality.
Richter's October 18, 1977 solicits the viewer's empathy -or feeling-in -the particular space occupied by the German terrorists of the Red army Faction by means of the naming of nothing. empathy constitutes the grey area wherein nothing can have being because this process empties 54 out the connotations of words such as «terrorists» and «raf». he intersubjective experience in which Richter's paintings announce the experiences of the I demands a continual re-patterning of «sieve-order» -that is to say, the naming of nothing. Richter's work irst of all 49 Richter also believes that the past and the future cannot be contained: «a painting by caspar david Friedrich is not a thing of the past. what is past is only the set of circumstances that allowed it to be painted: speciic ideologies, for example. Beyond that, if it is any "good", it concerns us -transcending ideology -as art that we consider worth the trouble of defending (perceiving, showing, making). It is therefore quite possible to paint like caspar david Friedrich "today"» (Richter 1993: 81 Lavelle 1927: 4) . 54 Robert Storr argues that historical information should accompany Richter's October 18, 1977 because «such information is needed if one is to fully understand them and absorb their impact. after all, the events they describe occurred over two decades ago» (Storr 2000: 36) . On the contrary, Richter's own art demands a phenomenological reduction that makes such information superluous. It is the emptying-out of history that concerns him. as Richter states, «[t]he political topicality of my October paintings means almost nothing to me, but in many reviews it is the irst or only thing that arouses interest, and the response to the pictures varies according to current political circumstances. I ind this rather a distraction» (Richter 1993: 178). excludes everything except «what is not subject to doubt, […] my experience of the thing […] together with its correlate, the full "phenomenon of the thing"» 55 . October 18, 1977 constitutes a series of adumbrations upon Richter's naming of nothing. he various sides inherent in this space provide the medium through which the viewer empathizes. It is on the other side that empathy allows richter's art to view the viewer by oscillating between the viewer and the art. In this process of viewing, the viewer begins to fulill «the need to communicate, the efort to ix one's own vision to deal with appearances (which are alien and must be given names and meanings)» 56 . In this continual attempt to give names and meanings to experiences which are then sifted away, the paintings move viewers to consider their need to perceive the other.
Richter's introductory painting in the October 18, 1977 cycle depicts a young girl, Ulrike Meinhof, who was one of the members of the revolutionary circle. however, the piece is entitled Youth Portrait. Richter's blurring 57 of Meinhof 's portrait accounts for his naming of nothing with regard to «Ulrike Meinhof». as a byword in the media coverage of the RaF, her proper name «operate [s] in the name of an emptying-out and wearing-away of [its] primary role» 58 . Richter thus advocates that his paintings are grounded in themselves: by means of this phenomenological reduction, he works with «nothing that can be eliminated» 59 . he proper name of «Ulrike Meinhof» is no longer a signiier relating to the person of Ulrike Meinhof as the signiied. In this moment of unpainting, Richter takes the standard function of a Saussurian semiotic relationship and perforates it into sieve-order. as he claims, «[i]n itself art is neither visible nor deinable: all that is visible and imitable is its circumstances, which are easily mistaken for the art itself» 60 . Youth Portrait perforates «Ulrike Meinhof» precisely because her name is blurred when no longer seen through the lens of her circumstances. he artwork inherent in Youth Portrait remains Richter's naming of nothing with regard to Ulrike Meinhof.
Richter reduces our deadly reality to art alone by this naming of nothing. his artistic reduction radically destabilizes the context of socio-historical meanings for two reasons. Firstly, history's dependence upon the names of its agents ap- 55 Stein 1989 : 4. 56 Richter 1993 Storr explains that Richter creates blurs by «feathering the edges of his forms or dragging his brush across the wet, gray pigment-loaded surface of the canvas that shapes and spaces elide» (Storr 2000: 28) . however, Richter does not want his artwork to be labeled by this technique of blurring. he refers instead to the luidity of boundaries that he creates: «I don't create blurs. Blurring is not the most important thing; nor is it an identity tag for my pictures. when I dissolve demarcations and create transitions, this is not in order to destroy the representation or to make it more artistic or less precise. he lowing transitions, the smooth, equalizing surfaces, clarify the content and make the representation credible» (Richter 1993: 36-37) . he also remarks that «I […] blur out the excess of unimportant information» (Richter 1993: 37 Richter continues to use our empathetic experience as the naming of nothing throughout the exhibit by moving from the no-name to the nowhen. as a nonevent, the nowhen best outlines that any one event -such as confrontation 1, confrontation 2, confrontation 3 -contains a plethora of sides to be perceived. Richter slows down the progression of cinematic 67 frames to an absolute standstill in the confrontation sequence. we see Gudrun ensslin turning to engage with the viewer in the irst piece, then looking at those who are taking her picture, and then turning away with a downcast head. each picture portrays the same 61 according to Stein, «[s] ocial life is performance art, a technique for liberating yourself from the weight of existence» (Stein 2000: 290 1989: 11. 67 Storr explains how Richter achieves this standstill in his paintings by means of camera frames: «Suddenly the duration of our gaze is thrown out of sync with the permanent "momentariness" of the image. we cannot match it up again by thinking that in the next photographically unrecorded instant he will turn away, she will turn toward us. Time has stopped twice, in the click of the shutter and in the extinction of a life. camera-time equals an increment of unchanging eternity» (Storr 2000: 103) .
woman revealing diferent sides of her face while obscuring her meaning. If these frames showing an image were sequenced in milli-seconds as in a ilm, then perhaps her mouth would move or her eyes would convey a sentiment. as in Youth Portrait, Richter destabilizes our view of ensslin by making this very refusal to make meaning into the focus of the work. he punches holes into any possible meaning that the woman could express by leaving the viewer with a refusal to reply which is initiated by ensslin's refusal to speak in the irst place.
as a result, the appearance of the pictures is the focal point, or lack thereof, in Richter's art. he intends to paint the appearance of reality 68 thereby capturing the multiple facets of the «passing-by» of experience. however, Richter anchors this moment of passing-by in attaching it to the empathetic experience 69 . as Stein remarks, the present being of the moment cannot exist isolated just as a point remains on a line and a crest connects to a wave 70 . Since the picture is reduced without any background information that would convey a politically charged meaning for the picture, the woman appears at irst isolated and alone. however, the woman in the confrontation series appears attached to the viewer through the empathetic experience: «art serves to establish community. It links us with others, and with the things around us, in a shared vision and efort» 71 . her moment of passing-by announces our perception of the art in which we confront what she has already seen. hus, her experience inds its anchor in the viewer's gaze -a confrontation that names nothing by etching it into viewer's sieve-order.
«he Frozen Allegory»
Richter's depictions of Gudrun ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof are the viewer's only direct encounters with living igures during the dénouement of the exhibition. In Arrest 1 and Arrest 2, Richter depicts the arrest of holger Meins, andreas Baader, and Jan-carl Raspe in Frankfurt on June 1, 1972. he arrest scene consolidates the move from no-name to the nowhen. Richter once more empties out their names by refusing to refer to them in the title for the piece. In addition, the viewer 68 Storr contends that «[t]he contrast between the starkness of the reality Richter chose to describe and the lack of deinition resulting from his technique […] created a muled dissonance between what the viewer can make out "inside" the picture and what he or she actually perceives as an otherwise visually accessible painting» (Storr 2000: 28) . however, Richter paints simply the appearance of reality: thus there is no tension between what he tries to depict and his technique. In addition, Storr's notion of the conlict between the inside and the outside of the paintings presupposes that one can move in and out of the works. On the contrary, Richter's paintings view the viewer. he viewer cannot see from the inside out. he viewer can only experience the painting as such. 69 Stein explains that being is never static and remains a becoming in need of time which in turn remains anchored in the present moment, or what de certeau would call passing-by: «he irm anchorage of time lies in the passing present» (Stein 2002: 40) . 70 Stein 2002: 38. 71 Richter 1993: 13. cannot even identify the situation: Richter forces us to acknowledge that this is a nowhen occurring in a no-place. he thus performs a reduction of the typical treatment of space «as a fact of nature, "naturalized" through the assignment of common-sense everyday meanings» 72 . Since the no-place cannot be doubted, it is in fact the only result of Richter's reduction. as the Youth Portrait and the confrontation series perceive the viewer, Richter makes this «blind-spot» 73 at the no-place confront the viewer as well. Arrest 1 and Arrest 2 force the viewer to see the no-place as a continual emptying-out of the supposed place of the arrest in Frankfurt. For viewers, «[w]hat counts is always the seeing» 74 and the no-place sees the viewers' blind spots. however, our seeing of Arrest 1 and Arrest 2 presents a double-sided vision in which the viewing of the no-place becomes «interiorized» in a radical way: the noplace is located inherently in the viewer as viewed as well as the «work of art» itself as its «fundamental structure» 75 . For Richter, the two-sidedness of the empathetic act inherent in the viewing of the work of art makes sense of the no-place. he shifting from Arrest 1 to Arrest 2 cannot be compared to a cinematic efect as in the confrontation series: the viewing of the no-place jolts our internal vision as viewers. each Arrest is «the frozen allegory of modernism as a whole and as a vast movement in time which no one can see or adequately represent» 76 . he shift is imperceptible and yet the painting halts our view in midair. herefore, the blind spot may be the only way to pass through the exhibit in the face of this stultiied view because «consciousness and subjectivity are unrepresentable» 77 . If Arrest 1 and Arrest 2 cannot depict consciousness and subjectivity, then viewers must ask how they perceive rather than what they see. he blind spot engendered by this frozen allegory refers to the empty ield of vision thus showing that «consciousness is consciousness-of-something» 78 . Richter forces viewers to see their blind spot as such, which is to be conscious of «this terrorism inside all of us» 79 . he paintings' capacity to see the State and the terrorist within each viewer accounts for how the viewer arrives at the no-place of absolutely arrested motion. In this suspension ofered by the painting's no-place, the viewer sees «place» emptied of all its usual commodities.
as a result of the no-place, viewers concentrate not on what is perceived in the painting -namely the building and the armored police truck -but rather on how they perceive 80 Richter 1993: 186. 80 while Terry eagleton believes that the phenomenological approach is «a wholly uncritical, non-evaluative mode of analysis,» his view bypasses the inherent relationality that phenomenology within the intersubjectivity, which in the phenomenological reduction, has reached empirical givenness on a transcendental level, and is thus itself transcendental, that the real (reale) world is constituted as "objective," as being there for everyone» 81 . he intersection of our view with the painting produces a two-sided vision. he juncture of this two-sided vision accounts for the painting's frozen allegories in that they are at once constitutive of the world as we see it while responsible for freezing that vision in all of its blurriness. as frozen allegories, the paintings place our habitus on hold in order to show that the intersubjective experience of empathy accounts for the no-place. hough the allegory for perception freezes even the progression of history, this inertia builds up a momentum that not only erases but also washes out the objective world. he only space that remains after this reduction is the no-place of intersubjectivity which transcends the viewer. Richter's paintings are an object only insofar as they appear to the viewer. he real world, as seen in the individual's habitus, can be seen as an object because of the experience of intersubjectivity. Jameson says that «modernity is a concept of otherness» 82 . Richter counters with his depiction of modernity 83 as the experience of otherness which eventually culminates in art as the longing for God. Intersubjectivity cannot be conceptualized; it can only be experienced. his cathartic moment leaves us with only the emptiness in our ield of vision. his blind-spot can help us to appreciate the Arrest series in its refusal to answer because both the empty answer and the blind view co-exist within the two-sidedness of intersubjectivity. he interiorization of the no-place of Arrest 1 and Arrest 2 thus indicates the viewer's blind spot.
In cell, Richter presents a space that is also devoid of any of the attributes that might deine it. as a result of the intense blurring, only the title, cell, signiies the designation of this particular space. however, the signiicance of "cell" as such sets in motion the oscillation of the no-place with/without attributes. he title allows us to think that the vertical and horizontal lines to the right of the painting are prison bars while this space could just as easily appear as a series of bookshelves 84 . he title sets the viewer on a tightrope trying to balance the perception of the examines (eagleton 1996: 52). Furthermore, he claims that phenomenology «must purge itself of its own predilections, plunge itself empathetically into the "world" of the work, and reproduce as exactly and unbiasedly as possible what it inds there» (eagleton 1996: 52). Phenomenology demands anything but a reproduction of artistic creativity: in fact, it goes beyond unbiased/biased viewpoints. he phenomenological reduction merely shows how we perceive and this perceiving exists primordially to any attempt on our part to understand the mechanics behind our perception. he efort to empathetically plunge oneself into a phenomenological analysis would destroy the primordiality inherent in a phenomenological analysis. Such an attempt is described by Richter's comments about artists whose eforts lead them from stupidity to absolute desperation (Richter 1993: 173) . 81 husserl 1967 81 husserl : 14-15. 82 Jameson 2002 harvey likewise notes the experiential nature of modernity: «Since modernity is about the experience of progress through modernization, writings on that theme have tended to emphasize temporality, the process of becoming, rather than being in space and place» (harvey 1993: 205) . 84 In fact, Richter's photographic model for andreas Baader's Stammheim cell does show these to be bookcases.
attributes of the space with their blurry efacement. cell acts as a frozen allegory of its own enigmatic pull on the viewer. while the title indicates how the viewer should interpret the work, it brings the viewer within the space of the painting.
By entering the cell, the viewer is forced to empathize with its occupant through the complicity of the terrorism inside of all of us. cell thus perceives the dividing line between the «State and the terrorist» 85 that goes through each individual's perception. In turn, cell makes this line permeable thereby throwing the prison bars' ability to conine disorderly forces into question. he function of the "cell" as a sign «indicate[s] primarily "wherein" one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something» 86 . hese three qualities of the "cell" -the where the viewer lives, the where of their concern, and the interaction of the where with an object -are inherently found within the cell. Richter thus places his viewers within the signifying of the sign -that is to say, within his painting. however, this remains a signifying shot full of space for the experience of empathy. By spatializing the sign «cell,» Richter imprisons each viewer within this space because it remains the encounter wherein empathy is experienced as a feeling-in cell. Our perception as viewers responds to the spatializing of cell by acknowledging that we live within the "cell" as much as the terrorists do.
Richter takes the record player out of the context of the cell and isolates it for our viewing. he record Player appears at irst as a commonplace depiction of a record player. Jean-François chevrier claims that Richter, in his selection of photographs for his paintings, demands an attention to the image itself:
he is not so much interested in the iconic value, nor in the traumatic shock of the thing photographed, but in the latent power of the image itself, which calls for pictorial fulillment -because this power, in its generality, is already that of painting 87 .
For Richter, painting goes beyond the dialectic of the banal/artistic 88 . he placement of the record player within the exhibit need not be explained because any attempt at «explaining away» 89 the record Player in terms of excess or banality would result in removing its artistic signiicance. Richter places the record Player in the middle of his October cycle in order to draw attention not to its possible role in Baader's death but rather to its taking up of space. In this sense of spatialization, the record player as the meaning content of the picture has nothing whatsoever to do with how it constitutes a frozen allegory of the empathetic experience. edith 85 Richter 1993 85 Richter : 186. 86 heidegger 1962 85 Richter : 111. 87 chevrier 2000 his is very similar to Michel Foucault's assertion that «[w]hat is interesting is always interconnection, not the primacy of this over that, which never has any meaning» (Foucault 1993: 140) . however, I am not looking at the interconnection between the banal and the artistic. contrary to John T. Paoletti's view, Richter doesn't work «at the boundary between art and non-art» because that boundary becomes the perforating function of sieve-order (Paoletti 1988: 2) . 89 Stein 1989: 45.
Stein's study of how the I can be moved by the other without any inluence of the meaning content illustrates the motor behind Richter's record player:
I can be swept along by someone else's mental life in other ways. For example, it's possible that through the reading of a book I'm "enlivened anew" and impelled toward a particular mental function. For sure, the enlivening efect isn't emanating from the printed symbols on the paper perceived by the senses. But the thought processes into which I penetrate by means of those symbols can have a verve and cadence that's a direct outlow of mental power and vigor. and if I, led by the words, re-realize somebody else's thought process step by step in understanding, then I "catch wind of" the vigor. It can, on one hand, confront me as a peculiarity of someone else's mental dealings; but it can also seize hold of me myself.
(he meaning content of the words plays no role in this. If enlivening efects emanate from the content -as is altogether possible -then they're inluences that don't have and needn't have anything to do with anyone else's subjectivity) 90 .
Stein here explains the way that the I can be propelled by the thought processes of the other. according to Stein, form is inherently at the juncture of intersubjective experience. If content does exert an inluence, then it relates solely to the I and its frustrated desire to form the content it perceives into packaged ideologies. whether or not the record player emits sound is of no concern; it is the form of the verve and cadence passing through the sieve that conveys the subjectivity of the other. hence, this sieve-order can have no content 91 because it exists only within the space of the no-place. Richter remarks: «I like to compare my process of making art to the composing of music. here, all personal expression has been subjugated to the structure and is not simply shouted» 92 . he form 93 of the cadence allows the I viewing the painting to be freed from all the content-illed ideologies that would prevent each note -or absence thereof -from carrying its tune. he viewers must catch on to the record Player in order to undergo the «execution» 94 of the work of art.
as a viewer and critic, Robert Brown fails to catch on to Richter's process of making art in record Player. Brown writes that «Richter too, in his old age, seems to acknowledge the limited value of the strict ideological constraints he has placed 90 Stein 2000: 175. 91 here Richter's own comments illustrate our point: «when I say that I take form as my starting point, and that I would like content to evolve out of form (and not the reverse process, whereby a form is found to it a literary idea), then this relects my conviction that form, the cohesion of formal elements, the structure of the phenomenal appearance of matter (= form), generates a content -and that I can manipulate the outward appearance as it comes, in such a way as to yield this or that content […] he issue of content is thus nonsense; i.e., there is nothing but form. here is only "something": there is only what there is» (Richter 1993: 127) . 92 dietrich 1985: 128. 93 according to Richter, form is necessary to communication: «without form communication stops; because without form you have everybody burbling on to themselves, whenever and however, things that no one can understand and -rightly -no one is interested in […] he form that we have in the art world today […] is entirely supericial» (Richter 1993: 198) . 94 dietrich 1985: 128. himself under. "Only sometimes am I free of them," he told Storr» 95 . Brown's vision of Richter errs in two respects. Firstly, we might note that Michel Foucault claims that «[t]he guarantee of freedom is freedom» 96 . In light of this freeing freedom, we can see that Brown fails to realize that Richter's intermittent ability to be free of ideologies in fact constitutes the process of his freedom as such. Richter's artistic freedom results from his continually being-freed from the ideologies that record Player deals with in every cadence. Secondly, Brown claims that Richter's reproductions of photographs through his paintings «are ictions that strike at the heart of human perception» 97 . On the contrary, Richter ofers the two-sidedness of empathy that, if anything, ofers a painful acknowledgement that the divide between the state / terrorist strikes through every heart thus making any attempt to pick sides impossible. Brown clings so desperately to content -from that of the paintings to the quantity of Richter's years -that he wouldn't recognize the sieve if he fell right through it. Richter's use of the no-place as a frozen allegory in the Arrest series, record Player, and cell purposely removes the content to which viewers and art critics 98 cling in order to make meaning out of the work of art. he thus creates ellipses everywhere in which we are seen by the October paintings. Stein explains how this viewed viewer is thus accompanied: Richter's never-ending invention of the sieve makes a peculiar demand upon the viewer. How Richter paints focuses upon the empathy between the I and the other. he other becomes the companion for all perceptions and their accompaniment 95 Brown 2002 : 49. 96 Foucault 1993 : 135. 97 Brown 2002 charles hall and Paoletti error in nearly the same manner as Brown by holding tenaciously to content. hall writes that «a series of blurry grayish paintings efectively reproducing snapshots and police photos of members of the Baader Meinhof gang, and their deaths […] in prison» were put on exhibition at the ica (hall 1994: 30) . as cork argues, Richter «eludes any facile attempt to pigeonhole his multifaceted work,» especially within the category of blurry (cork 1992: 49) . In addition, he has no conscious connections and thus no interest in reproducing the pictures as such. hroughout his article, hall misses the point of Richter's supposed meaning above all when he claims that Youth Portrait «means exactly what we will allow it to mean» (hall 1994: 30) . Likewise, Paoletti remarks: «although there is certainly no consistent program of content in Richter's prints, his engagement with his own cultural and political history in several of the images cannot be ignored» (Paoletti 1988: 4-5) . he critics seem panic-stricken when Richter sends them through the sieve as they hold onto their precious content. 99 Stein 2000: 292. makes the I's view into a series of hole punches. It is within this no-place that the viewer comes face to face with the other.
a Priori Art
Richter's paintings of death in October 18, 1977 confront us by depicting the power of ideology -whether that of the state or the terrorist -as a mis-alignment of empathy
100
. any ideology becomes an illusive attempt to set up equivalences of meanings thus attempting to contain our perception. as Richter's artwork shows, empathy can be neither forced nor contained. In fact, trying to empathize would constitute «a distraction» 101 from the art itself. while Gregg horowitz argues that the paintings make the deaths of the terrorists present «in lingering with the unlaid ghosts of Baader-Meinhof» Hanged is perhaps the most diicult and disturbing painting of the entire October 18, 1977 exhibition. Rather than necessarily depicting death, Richter's painting forces us to encounter it «with skepticism and analysis»
104
. while the igure in the three-part Dead series looks dead, the person in Hanged cannot be distinguished because of the eerie quality of the lighting. It is as though the entire space of the room were being engulfed by the darkness. In this sense, the igure seems to move with the luidity of the cell. he viewer's gaze is likewise steered down what John Milton calls a «pathless way» (70) in his poem, Il Penseroso. Richter uses this pathless way in order to test the sincerity of the viewer's empathy. Louis Lavelle's description of death explores what it means to be sincere before our own perforation in time.
One is only perfectly sincere in the presence of death, because death is irrevocable, and, by terminating our existence, confers upon it the character of the absolute 105 .
Richter places us before this absolute puncturing of existence in death and, in so doing, questions whether or not death's imposition of sieve-order entails an ending. Since empathy never establishes one-to-one meanings but only relations, it 100 Richter explains his interest in the power of an idea: «and then the tremendous strength, the terrifying power that an idea has, which goes as far as death. hat is the most impressive thing, to me, and the most inexplicable thing; that we produce ideas, which are almost always not only utterly wrong and nonsensical but above all dangerous» (Richter 1993: 193) . Furthermore, Richter states «ever since I have been able to think, I have known that every rule and every opinion -insofar as either is ideologically motivated -is false, a hindrance, a menace or a crime» (Richter 1993: 175) . 101 Richter 1993 101 Richter : 178. 102 horowitz 2001 Ibidem. 104 Richter 1993 : 242. 105 Lavelle 1973 navigates death in an always pathless manner that has no deined end. he disturbing quality of Hanged results precisely from the indeterminacy of death since, as Gabriel Marcel suggests, this inishing of existence might not be a désincarnation
106
. he viewer's sincerity before death allows for faith, as the longing for God, to be tested by skepticism in order to assure that all ideologies are washed away. Richter uses the sieve-order of death as a frozen allegory whose inherent lack of meaning moves us through the exhibit.
Richter's focus is not on the particular death of any of the terrorists but rather on death as a «leavetaking» 107 . he paints by way of his compassion for «the death that the terrorist had to sufer» 108 and their failure in that «an illusion of being able to change the world has failed» 109 . For Richter, death intricately connects with this failure to change the world because the world appears frozen. his in turn compels the leavetaking of the terrorists with no regard for whether their deaths can be named murders or suicides:
Factually: these speciic persons are dead; as a general statement, death is leavetaking. and then ideologically: a leavetaking from a speciic doctrine of salvation and, beyond that, from the illusion that unacceptable circumstances of life can be changed by this conventional expedient of violent struggle (this kind of revolutionary thought and action is futile and passé) 110 .
By viewing death as a leavetaking, Richter reduces death to the functionality of the sieve-order in his art. October 18, 1977 becomes a leavetaking in which the viewer encounters the refusal to answer as a refusal to see. In this sense, Richter's paintings of the dead refuse to show death. herefore, death relates to the a priori as the space wherein the picture cannot be viewed as an object but only experienced as the previous luctuation of sieve-order. Since view by deinition luctuates because of empathy, our ability to see a frozen world in fact refuses to see at all. Richter's non-view of death reduces the entire world of existence to a credible experience -that is to say, a leave-taking from all my preconceptions which must be abandoned for the a priori's view.
as a leave-taking, death is inherently related to the a priori in its refusal to see. however, this relationality is not meant in the sense that death, to use hannah arendt's terms, is «the most common of occurrences, [which] nevertheless strikes me unavoidably alone» 111 . In empathy, death never strikes once because it misses its initial mark and strikes twice. Richter's portrayal of death in Dead, Dead, and Dead, leaves the sphere of the singular and enters the horriic. he chilling eeriness of the dead results from our relation to the picture. as viewers, we want to distance ourselves by taking refuge in our idea of death as a singular / general happening. Marcel's notion of death as a dépaysement emphasizes death as the movement from one place to another 112 . he transposition of our supposedly frozen view of death through the sieve-order of each painting in the Dead series makes us doubt what we see. By the numbering in the titles of the Man Shot Down series, Richter also throws into question the singular happening of the man's death. he viewer cannot judge whether or not this man's death happened in Man Shot Down 1 or Man Shot Down 2. Richter indicates that death can neither be pinpointed as an individual occurrence nor as a general one. his reduction of death leads us to the a priori view so as to remove all possibility of any response.
he relationality of the experience of death inheres a primordial experience that conigures the momentum of leavetaking into art. Fully anchored in the space of the primordial, sieve-order allows the viewer to experience «the pure realization of religious feeling, capacity for faith, longing for God» 113 in art as such. hence, God's a priori view alone «assuage[s] our need for faith» 114 without the danger of an ideology. however, this predicates that we continually take our leave from ideologies at every moment because of their attempt to make meaning without the a priori. For Richter, mortality becomes the establishment of an empathetic relationship with God that remains predicated upon a dépaysement.
From the standpoint of the non-view, Funeral records an exile not only for the dead but also for the numerous people in the crowd paying their respects to a failed ideology. he non-view thus allows for a remarkable insight into the consciousness of the mourners. Richter deines consciousness as «the capacity to visualize and therefore the belief that keeps us alive» 115 . hough we believe in our capacity to visualize, we place our trust in a view that we can never see. he exile inherent in the non-view of Funeral admits that «consciousness is unrepresentable» 116 . as the inal searing, the exile of the non-view becomes Richter's last perforating act of mistrust against our eyesight: is thus nonsense; i.e., there is nothing but form» 118 . Richter identiies faith 119 with form because it alone allows the a priori malleability necessary to artistic creation. In the movement inherent in sieve-order, the a priori turns out to be the only survivor of Richter's reductive leavetaking. A priori art thus embodies a continual leavetaking whose mere evocation in October 18, 1977 constitutes our experience of intersubjectivity.
Phenomenology of Dreams
If «Spatial images (raumbilder) are the dreams of society» 120 , as Siegfried Kracauer claims, then Richter's paintings evoke a way out of these sham dreams into the absolute sincerity of an a priori art. Perhaps we might ind ourselves caught in a new question: who dreams these dreams? he viewed viewer can no longer decipher these images because such dreams have lived through sieve-order and are no longer decipherable. Richter's October 18, 1977 leaves us with a phenomenology of dreams where there is no easy way out. he images depicted see the viewer since sieve-order is the only possible exit. It is an exit into a debut that questions all contradictions with the phenomenology of a dream in which the I learns to empathize with the other. Perhaps empathy is the dream of society in that it has no form that can be deciphered but only the expression of an intersubjectivity blurred in its rite of passage. confrontation thus yields the naming of nothing and that nothing is more haunting that the most certain of images. Richter's October 18, 1977 describes a phenomenology of dreams which cannot be interpreted but only viewed as such. Since the viewers of the October paintings are already viewed, they ind themselves under the demanding view of the dream. he viewed viewers are always watched by the dream. hey ask a new question that not only refracts upon them in viewing October 18, 1977 but also pulls their dreams through sieveorder in order to discover hope. Such dreams have been iltered through sieveorder. Frame by frame, shot by shot, they are formed into the viewer as viewed by a phenomenology of dreams.
he dreams that Richter depicts in October 18, 1977 are dreams that presuppose nothing -not even their representation in images. If we are arrested in moving through the sieve, then this frozen allegory has a moment of respite. Turn and see what the dream creates because a dream creates the creators. he phenomenology 118 Ivi: 127. 119 Richter's view of faith remains integral to his artwork: «Faith, and here I repeat myself, is the awareness of things to come; it therefore equals hope, it equals illusion, and is quintessentially human (I cannot imagine how animals get along without such an awareness); because, without this mental image of "tomorrow", we are incapable of life» (Richter 1993: 177) . Faith includes how we see his paintings: «whatever the case might be, Richter defends himself brutally against any attempt to perceive, under the guise of irony, his painting as an analytic conceptual paraphrase or a rejection of the content of the painted image. In response to such a temptation, he laconically answers: "One doesn't escape from faith; it is a part of ourselves"» (my translation, drathen 1992: 67). 120 witte 1975: 63. My thanks to Professor david Rodowick for helping me ind this citation.
of dreams advocated by Richter's paintings shows viewers who are viewed by the creators of a priori art if only these creators are rich enough to give away their images in the experience of empathy. A priori art gives us the view as such in all the painful beauty of its relection in our own dreams. he viewed viewer is a dreamer who lacks any images and so presupposes nothing. consequently, the viewed viewer does not run the risk of mis-aligning empathy. a phenomenology of dreams thus reorders our perceptions by presupposing nothing. If our dreams spatialize, then they spatialize according to an order that punctures all our frozen allegories. Sieve-order can tackle even the most stubborn mediums and make them blurry images of arrested development. If we are still alicted with a more than common stupidity, then perhaps our lingering obstinacy is due to our self-assurance when even the glass of Galileo and the eyes of Richter are willing to ofer those blurry images of a view humbled by what the viewed viewer sees. as a continual leavetaking, October 18, 1977 could never serve as a stage in Richter's work as an artist because, as he admits, nothing could follow these paintings. here is no sequel to a dream because it asks for nothing not even a response. October 18, 1977 begins by using a sieve-order to communicate the paintings' ability to view the viewer. Our dreams are the material that is required by Richter's use of sieve-order. If we do not come with dreams, sieve-order will spatialize what we do see accordingly. his sieve-order oscillates from the no-name to the no-place and inally to the non-view. each phase asks nothing of viewers -that is, a nothing which entails our faith in the a priori as such. he a priori moves each phase of sieve-order along by making spatial images of empathy unrepresentable. here is no one-to-one correspondence but rather the multitude of openings seen through the constellation of sieve-order. Our perception of sieve-order responds to the previous conigurations of the sieve but without any efort. every response catches on to each previous one: «einstein did not think when he was calculating: he calculated -producing the next equation in reaction to the one that went before -just as in painting one form is a response to another, and so on» 121 . he relationality of Richter's paintings makes our perceptual response to each form in the October paintings a perforation that leaves us only with a priori art. Perhaps dreams that presuppose nothing are honest enough to admit that their exit through sieve-order is the possibility of their creation. a phenomenology of dreams has no answers but it admits with humility that it only wanted to show that the essence of empathy is viewed in the viewer as such. If it seems less conident than what we may be accustomed to, then perhaps dreams admit a sense of mortality in which the creation can live beyond the creator. dreams live under the last request of the viewed viewer transcribed in Richter's October paintings. You cannot name this last wish but you can follow it with more or less assurance through the stars.
